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Every Argentine citizen is aware of the numerous proceedings, complex or
not, which require that we submit our National ID Card (DNI). Such sit-
uation occurs every day: banking operations, buying long distance tickets
and entering public and private buildings which require the submission of
a card that has been with us since 1968, when the Executive Order 17671,
issued by Juan Carlos Onganı́a, created the DNI as a document to iden-
tify all citizens. 1 Many societies would be surprised to see these little cards
present in our daily life: there are many countries which do not have unique
systems for identifying citizens and, when they tried to impose them, such
systems failed given the strong rejection by the community. 2
Public policies for identifying, registering and classifying “national human po-
tential” became more efficient and effective with technological advances.
3 We changed from stored files which could be reviewed upon a person’s
request to digital information on computer systems for storage and verifica-
tion. The unique DNI, which will become effective as from 2015, will allow
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3The law which created the DNI is called Law 17671 on Identifying, Registering and
Classifying National Human Potential.
1
all Argentine citizens’ data to integrate a unique database of biometric dig-
italized information. 4
Technological advances regarding classification of Argentines’ filiation data
have spread, in general, through every area of the State. The information
which was previously collected in analogue format is now obtained in dig-
ital format, which makes it more useful: digital formats enable automated
analysis, remote access and low cost reproduction. However, such greater
effectiveness has created new risks that did not arise with analogue systems.
This document seeks to enquire about those risks by providing answers to
the following questions:
• 1. Does the Argentine legal system properly protect our personal
data or does it have deficiencies –in design or in implementation–
which put such data at risk?
• 2. What kind of databases does the Argentine State have? Do those
databases have security measures, protected systems with remote
control, authorization levels in order to access to them? Is there a
recording of the access? Are there standardized security protocols?
• 3. Has security regarding such databases ever been infringed? What
has the State done in such cases?
I Law on the Protection of Personal Data and two
original sins
The Argentine legal framework concerning the protection of personal data
is one of the best frameworks within the region. In fact, Argentina has a con-
stitutional guarantee for the protection of personal data which is recognized
in the Argentine Constitution, Section 43:
“Any person shall file this action to obtain information on the
data about himself and their purpose, registered in public records
or data bases, or in private ones intended to supply information;
and in case of false data or discrimination, this action may be
filed to request the suppression, rectification, confidentiality or
updating of said data. The secret nature of the sources of jour-
nalistic information shall not be impaired.”
4Cfr. Telam. A partir de 2015 el DNI tarjeta será el único documento válido. Consulted
on 19 June 2014 and La Nación. A partir de 2015, sólo tendrá validez el nuevo “DNI tarjeta”.
Consulted on 19 June 2014. It is important to mention that when we talk about biometric
data we refer to information regarding the individuals’ physical features which is used for
identifying purposes, such as fingerprints, photographs, facial images, etc.
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Law 25326 on the Protection of Personal Data adopts the principles of the Di-
rective No. 95/46/EC of the European Union. This rule sets high standards
of protection and the EU has considered Argentina as a country with an
adequate level of personal data protection since 2003 (Travieso, 2006).
However, this protective legal framework has two structural weaknesses:
(a) a weak controlling agency which depends on the executive branch and
(b) excessive allowances in favor of the State regarding storage, processing
and communication of personal data.
As regards the first issue, the original version of the Law 25326 intended to
create a controlling agency with “functional autonomy” that would act “as
a decentralized agency within the framework of the National Ministry of
Justice and Human Rights.” Such agency would have a director appointed
by the executive branch, with the approval of the Senate, for a period of
four years. Those guarantees of functional autonomy and financial self-
sufficiency were set aside when the executive branch promulgated the law
partially by issuing the Executive Order 995/00, which kept the agency
within the scope of the executive branch for financial reasons. Such deci-
sion was key to create a weak controlling agency which depends on the
executive branch. 5
In order to address the second issue, it is useful to analyze the structure of
the Law 25326, which protects personal data by means of two general bans
that seem to play a vital role in the legal architecture of the law: the bans
on processing and communicating personal data without the consent of their
owners. 6 Both bans seek to prevent the illegal use of citizens’ data through
a method which seems effective: empowering citizens with the capacity to
prevent third parties from using such data for purposes not authorized by
citizens. However, the law that gives us such power also takes it away from
us when we want to enforce it against the State.
In fact, Section 5 requires consent but states that such consent shall not be
deemed necessary when the data are “collected for the performance of the
duties inherent in the powers of the State or when the data arise from a con-
tractual relationship”. This means that the guarantee of consent is useless
when the data are collected by the State. Furthermore, Section 11 bans the
communication of data if the data owner has not previously consented to it.
However –again– this guarantee may be set aside when a law so provides,
when the data are collected for the performance of the duties inherent in the
powers of the State or when the communication of data takes place directly
between governmental agencies to the extent of their corresponding compe-
5Even though the Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 29.1 states that the “Director shall
exclusively devote to his or her functions, shall perform his functions independently and
shall not be subject to any instructions”.”
6Law 25326, Sections 5.1 and 11.1.
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tencies.7. As we can see, the guarantees set forth by such law are in general
set aside when data is collected by the State.
Through these broadly stated exceptions, Law 25326 allows the State to
evade the bans which are the key of such Law’s structure: the bans on pro-
cessing or communicating data without the owner’s consent. As a conse-
quence, citizens are deprived of the main tool to protect the privacy of their
data.
We are now in a position to answer the first question: does the Argentine
legal system properly protect our personal data or does it have deficiencies
which put such data at risk? Two problems related to the design of such
law which seem to be particularly relevant to the purpose of this study have
been identified:
1. On the one hand, the agency created by the law was set aside by the
executive branch upon partial promulgation of the law. Moreover, the
agency created instead lacks the guarantees of autonomy which were
stated in the original version of the law.
2. On the other hand, the two structural bans which empower the right of
citizens not to consent the processing of their data are not enforceable
against governmental agencies which can also communicate such data
to other governmental bodies with no major restrictions.
In the following section, we seek to analyze whether, in addition to these
deficiencies in design, there are also difficulties in the application of the cur-
rent system.
II The State and personal data
In Argentina, the agency in charge of the defense of citizens’ personal data
is the National Bureau of Personal Data Protection (DNPDP) which was cre-
ated –as we have already seen– with serious limitations in its powers. Are
those structural problems reflected in the agency’s acts? In order to answer
this, it is necessary to analyze whether the lack of financial self-sufficiency
which was stated in the law has affected the structure of the DNPDP and
whether the wide allowances granted to the State by such law have affected
the performance of the agency.
7Cfr. Law 25326, Section 11.3.
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Structure and performance of the DNPDP
If we analyze the operating budget of the DNPDP since it was created it may
be seen that it has always been relatively low, both in terms of resources
and of staff. 8 If we take into account the budget data and the year-on-
year inflation, it is also possible to see that some cases of nominal increase
represented an actual decrease of the budget for such years, such as the case
of years 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2013. The budget of the DNPDP has
only increased between 2010 and 2012. As a result, there has also been an
increase in the staff (Table 1).
Year Budget Staff Inflation Actual Variation
2014 ARS 5,662,014 26
2013 ARS 4,291,557 25 28.3 -
2012 ARS 3,809,908 25 25.9 +
2011 ARS 1,727,045 23 24.3 +
2010 ARS 1,021,095 21 26.1 +
2009 ARS 862,729 21 16.7 -
2008 ARS 728,605 11 23.5 -
2007 ARS 702,158 10 8.8 +
2006 ARS 396,667 10 1.9 -
2005 ARS 380,091 10 9.8 -
2004 ARS 595,124 9 4.4
Table 1: Budget and structure of the DNPDP (2004-2014).
It is really useful to analyze the budget and structure of the DNPDP if we
compare such data with its functions set forth in Law 25326 .
• To give any requesting party assistance and advice on the scope of
this Act and the legal means available for the defense of the rights
guaranteed by the same (Section 29.1.a).
• To pronounce the rules and regulations to be observed in the develop-
ment of the activities covered by this Act (Section 29.1.b)
• To do a census of data files, registers or banks covered by the Act and
keep a permanent record thereof (Section 29.1.c)
• To control compliance with the norms on data integrity and security
by data files (Section 29.1.d)
• To request information from public and private entities (Section 29.1.e).
• To initiate proceedings and enforce the administrative sanctions that
may apply (Section 29.1.f and Executive Order 558/01, Section 30.).
8The Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 29.3 stated that the DNPDP shall be financed
with the funds collected as fees for the services provided; with the funds derived from
the fines established in section 31 of the Law 25326; and with the budgetary allocation
included in the Budget of the National Administration Law (Ley de Presupuesto de la
Administración Nacional) as from year 2002.
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• To assume the role of accuser in criminal actions brought for violations
of this Act (Section 29.1.g).
• To control fulfillment of requirements and guarantees to be met by pri-
vate files or banks which provide reports to obtain the corresponding
registration with the Register created by this Act (Section 29.1.h).
• To monitor exofficio the due compliance of the legal principle of speci-
fication of purpose and to impose sanctions (Regulatory Decree 1558/01,
Section 4).
• To check the due compliance with the legal and regulatory provisions
concerning every stage of the use of personal data: collection, ex-
change, communication and cession (Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Sec-
tion 4)
• To establish the requirements for the consent to be given by means
other than written notification (Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 5).
• To stimulate the cooperation among public and private sectors (Regu-
latory Decree 1558/01, Section 9).
• To deal with complaints raised upon denial of the right to access to
personal data (Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 14).
• To provide a sample form to exercise the right to access to personal
data (Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 15).
• To issue complementary rules regarding contracts of chambers, asso-
ciations and professional organizations.
• To issue the administrative and procedural rules related to registra-
tion proceedings as well as to the treatment and security conditions
of public and private databases (Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section
29.5)
• To deal with complaints related to the treatment of personal data (Reg-
ulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 29.5).
• To collect the fees established for the services of registration and other
services provided (Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 29.5).
• To organize the Registry of public and private databases (Regulatory
Decree 1558/01, Section 29.5).
• To elaborate the necessary tools suitable for the best citizens data pro-
tection (Regulatory Decree 1558/01, Section 29.5).
• To encourage the creation of codes of conduct (Regulatory Decree 1558/01,
Section 30).
As shown in the previous list, the functions of the DNPDP set forth by the
law and by the regulatory decree are extremely ambitious and seem to be
designed for an independent agency with financial self-sufficiency and with
a structure necessary in order to perform such functions properly. In fact,
the functions of the DNPDP set forth by both the law and the regulatory
decree include advice for citizens, regulation of powers, control and regis-
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tration of public and private databases and application of sanctions upon
default. The DNPDP shall has broad jurisdiction throughout the country.
However, during the first six years of its creation, it only had ten employ-
ees (see Table 1). It is also important to highlight that the number of staff
remained limited even when technology evolved and made storage and
processing of all kind of data easier. In other words: the structure of the
controlling agency was kept relatively unchanged as the controlling activity
dramatically increased.
The issue mentioned in the previous paragraph is clearer if we carefully
analyze the controlling powers of the DNPDP. According to the data pro-
vided by the DNPDP, between 2008 and 2012 the DNPDP has conducted
137 inspections (Table 2) even though there were more than 60 thousand
databases registered with the National Registry of Databases by the end of
2006. 9






Table 2: Number of inspections conducted by the DNPDP (2008-2012).
The analysis shows that there is a correlation between the design of insti-
tutions and their actual performance: a controlling agency which has been
denied the guarantees of autonomy and financial self-sufficiency set forth
by the law and which had a low budget and a limited number of staff in
order to perform activities that exceeded the actual institutional capabili-
ties available. The difference between what was expected by the law and
the structure created by the executive branch has limited the performance
of the DNPDP, performance which has also been lenient with the State not
only due to the lack of autonomy of the agency but also due to biases in the
law which have been previously identified and will we described below.
Excercise of powers
Just like the budget and the structure of the DNPDP seem to evidence a sit-
uation of weakness, it is also possible to prove the allowances of the law
in favor of the State regarding the performance of the DNPDP. In fact, the
137 inspections conducted by the DNPDP between 2008 and 2012 were car-
9Cfr. Diario Judicial. Registro de bases de datos: esperan 60 mil inscriptos a fin de año. (25 May
2006). Available at: www.diariojudicial.com/contenidos/2006/05/26/noticia 0009.html
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ried out in private companies: governmental agencies responsible for any
databases have never been inspected by the DNPDP between those years.
10
It is also possible to check the penalties imposed by the DNPDP for breach-
ing the law: the 36 penalties imposed by the DNPDP between 2005 and
2013 have been imposed on private entities. The State has always avoided
the power to punish a controlling agency which depends on the executive
branch and has –as a consequence– a weak power to impose penalties on
agencies with the same or, in general, with superior powers.
Nevertheless, it is important to analyze the penalties imposed by the DNPDP:
they show that the exercise of powers to impose penalties requires –for sev-
eral reasons– a structure the DNPDP seems not to have. In fact, 42 per cent
of the penalties have been imposed on private entities due to mistakes in
registration, in re-registration or in updating databases (Table 4). Other 25
per cent of the penalties have been imposed due to unsolved deficiencies
identified by the DNPDP upon inspections conducted on entities holders of
databases. Therefore, 67 per cent of the penalties have been imposed due
to minor issues or upon the result of the inspections conducted which were
–as mentioned above– 137 inspections on a basis of more than 60 thousand
holders of databases registered.
Reason to impose penalties Percentage
Denial of the right to access information 8.33%
Wrong information regarding debtors 8.33%
Reports produced without legal background 8.33%
Inspections 25.00%
Re-registration, updating of data 41.67%
Wrong allocation of telephone lines 8.33%
Table 3: Category of penalties imposed by the DNPDP between 2005 and 2013 according to
the data provided by the DNPDP.
The content of the remaining penalties relates to some of the most serious
problems faced by Argentine citizens concerning their personal data: the in-
correct registration of debtors with public and private registries, the denial
of the right to access to their own personal data and the execution of reports
regarding citizens which are contrary to Law 25326.
The first issue has been one of the main reasons for filing complaints re-
garding personal data: the incorrect registration of debtors with a debtors’
registry raises a large number of difficulties related, specially, to the access
of bank loans. The DNPDP has imposed penalties on three cases to private
10The lists of inspections conducted by the DNPDP are available at:
www.jus.gob.ar/datos-personales.
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entities which had provided wrong status of debtors concerning their clients.
The second issue relates to the denial of the right to access to data which
means to enable individuals to know which data is held about them by the
holder of a database.
The third issue is one of the most serious and is related to the spread of web-
sites which sell citizens’ reports including personal data, such as domicile,
marital status or financial situation, among others. 11 For such reason, it is
meaningful to analyze what the DNPD has declared regarding this issue.
There are three relevant penalties about this issue: one against the entity Ad-
vanced Development Solutions S.R.L. (hereinafter referred to as ADS), which
maintains the website www.reportesonline.com, and two against Globinfo
Argentina, which is an undertaking of Open Discovery S.A.
The complaint against ADS was the result of several individuals’ complaints
who obtained personal data reports through ADS’s website. Complainants
claimed they were able to access –through this service– to data concerning
previous employments, property, relatives other than the spouse, level of
wages and neighbours’ personal data, among others. The DNPD consid-
ered that this service was contrary to citizens’ interests, to the guarantee of
cession of data and to principle of specification of purpose. The DNPDP has
also highlighted that the access to information regarding wages is not pos-
sible through “databases of unrestricted public access”. Therefore, it may
be assumed that there has been an illegal processing of the data since the
holder of such data has not given his/her free, express and informed con-
sent.
The complaints against Globalinfo Argentina, on the other hand, have been
filed by petition of the Ombudsman’s Office for the City of Buenos Aires
(Defensorı́a del Pueblo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires) and by a private cit-
izen. The analysis of the DNPDP shows one of the practices which has the
greater impact on citizens’ personal rights and which relates to entities en-
gaged in the storage and processing of reports with trading purposes. 12
Such websites offer different kinds of reports. They often provide, for free,
citizens’ names, DNI number and address recorded in several public reg-
istries. However, if one is willing to pay, they provide more valuable data
which is more difficult to obtain through the means referred to in the previ-
ous paragraph.
The DNPDP considered that the processing of data by Globalinfo was not
necessarily contrary to the law but the cession of data to third parties was. It
also considered that the reports produced by Globalinfo were excessive since




they provided data concerning the financial situation of citizens in order to
trace them and such financial reports contained the information needed to
trace them13. As regards the information sources, the DNPDP considered
that –in principle– Globalinfo had access to such data through public sources
of unrestricted access but those sources were never described.
Much of the information contained in this reports comes from governmen-
tal databases which stored such data for specific purposes. For example, the
National Registry of People, the Argentine Registry of Real and Personal
Property, the National Social Security Administration (ANSES), among oth-
ers. The opinion does not enquire about how such data was obtained: it
only highlights that pursuant to Regulatory Decree 1558/2001, Section 11
“In the particular case of public databases or archives of an official agency
which according to its specific functions were intended to be released to
the general public, the requirement concerning the legitimate interest of the
grantee shall be considered implicit in the general interest that caused the
unrestricted public access”. The question at stake is: Are all public govern-
mental databases designed for the access of general public? Under which
conditions and guarantees is the cession of data authorized? Neither does
the opinion answer this issue nor does it question governmental practices
which seem to be the main cause of spread of this practices for entities that
infringe citizens’ rights.
III The DNPDP and governmental databases
So far, we have seen how the law has created a weak enforcement agency
and how it has been excessively lenient with respect to storage, processing
and cession of data performed by the State. We have also proved that the
weakness arising upon the partial promulgation of the law which created
the enforcement agency was affirmed by a low budget and a limited number
of staff. We have also shown that there is a considerable gap between the
powers of the DNPDP and the resources available as well as a strong bias
towards private entities which may derive from the permissibility of the law
towards governmental agencies.
Based on such partial findings, we have tried to show governmental prac-
tices regarding their databases through 16 requests to access to public data14
13DNPDP. Regulation No. 005, 22 April 2008, page 184.
14The agencies and registries consulted were: National Criminal Intelligence Depart-
ment (DNIC); National Registries of motor vehicles and secured loans (DNRPA); National
Copyright Office (DNDA); National Registry of Information concerning Missing Minors
(RNIPME); National Department for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
(Dirección Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario); Na-
tional Registry of Rural Land (RNTR); National Contracting Office (ONC); General Depart-
ment for Personnel and Welfare of the Argentine Army (Dirección general de personal y
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through which we searched for responses to specific basis questions. 15 In
general, the number of responses was high: ten agencies answered such
requests but in several occasions they raised legal defenses and addressed
such requests partially. However, from such range of answers and of infor-
mation concerning secondary sources, it is possible to get an overall image
of the way in which the State processes citizens’ data. The following find-
ings raised from analyzing such answers:
• In general, all databases have different levels of access according to
staff categories.
• Servers are usually located at the offices were such agencies perform
their activities.
• Security measures seem to be related to personal passwords of each
bienestar del Ejército Argentino); Secretary of Institutional Organization and Management
(Secretarı́a de gestión y articulación institucional); National Registry of Family Agriculture
(RENAF); Federal Penitentiary Service (SPF); National Migration Office (DNM).
15The questions raised in the requests to access to public data were the following: “Inte-
gration of files, records, databases or data banks of the [Registry X]. Mainly, we are inter-
ested to know (a) whether [Registry X] has files, records, databases or data banks. If it has
more than one, please identify them; (b) physical location of servers which contain files,
records, databases or data banks; (c) data of individuals contained in such files, records,
databases or data banks (such as DNI number, number of process, name, surname, photo-
graph, etc). Define and identify (if more than one) each registration system separately. //
Who can have access to those files, records, databases or data banks? Please indicate the
name, surname and position of authorized officers. In the case of personnel of the [Registry
X], are there several categories with different levels of access? Are third parties not related
to the [Registry X] allowed to access to databases? If applicable, please identify third par-
ties authorized to access. If there are different files, records, databases or data banks, please
identify each case. // How can those files, records, databases or data banks be accessed?
For instance, we are interested in technical details of the access, that is to say, if it happens
through networking computers; if authorized persons have to use a password in order to
access; if such password is personal, etc. If such password is lost, what is the proceeding
to create a new one? Is this situation recorded? Where? If there are different files, records,
databases or data banks, please identify each case. What kind of safety measures do those
files, records, databases or data banks of the [Registry X] have? For example, we would
like to know whether they are connected to the Internet and -if they are- what kind of
safety measures do those files, records, databases or data banks have in order to prevent
intrusions of unauthorized persons? If there are different files, records, databases or data
banks, please identify each case. // Has there been any case of unauthorized downloading
of data? If that situation has occurred, how has the [Registry X] acted upon knowledge of
the situation? If there were no intrusions of unauthorized persons, what would be the pro-
ceeding if there were intrusions? // Who are in charge of providing technical support for
the different problems that may arise in files, records, databases or data banks?// Do those
persons have unrestricted access to the files, records, databases or data banks? Who do
they report to? Please indicate the name, surname and position. // How are the requests
of information of the [Registry X] recorded when they are required by other entities? Please
distinguish between requests made by entities belonging to the executive, legislative or ju-
dicial branches (in the event of any difference).”
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employee, however, in many occasions such agencies were reluctant
to provide information regarding security measures techniques.
• Security depends on the computing area of each agency.
These findings arise from the different responses given by the public agen-
cies which answered the requests to access to public data. It is important to
highlight that it was not possible to obtain information regarding which of-
ficers are authorized to access the information contained in databases since
those agencies considered that such information is reached by the excep-
tions to access to data which are set forth in the Regulatory Decree 1172/03,
Annex VII. 16 They also denied the access to data regarding “technical and
organizational measures the agency must take to guarantee the security and
confidentiality of personal data” pursuant to Law 25326, Section 9. 17 In
many cases, they only provided general information concerning the exis-
tence of staff categories with different levels of access. 18 For example, the
National Registry of Information concerning Missing Minors (RNIPME) in-
formed that the access is by “categories” (such as coordinator, social team,
lawyers, technical operators) and that “each user [can] carry out the tasks
allowed according to their category and only regarding information of their
area”. 19 In the same respect, the National Registry of Rural Land (RNTR)
16See, for example, the response of Esteban F. de Gracia, Director of the Nominative and
Fingerprinting Registration of the National Registry of Recidivists (Registro Nominativo y
Dactiloscópico del Registro Nacional de Reincidencia), 15 January 2014 (copy of the files
available at ADC).
17Response of Esteban F. de Gracia, Director of the Nominative and Fingerprinting Reg-
istration of the National Registry of Recidivists (Registro Nominativo y Dactiloscópico del
Registro Nacional de Reincidencia), 15 January 2014 (copy of the files available at ADC);
response of Inés Garcı́a Holgado, legal adviser of the National Copyright Office, 10 Jan-
uary 2014 (files available at ADC), response of Manuel Enrique Pedreida, Director of the
National Registry of Family Agriculture, 7 November 2013 (files available at ADC). It is
important to highlight that Section 9 of the Law 25326 does not prevent information re-
garding security measures from being requested since it sets forth –in its relevant part–
the following: “Section 9.1. The person responsible for or the user of data files must take
such technical and organizational measures as are necessary to guarantee the security and
confidentiality of personal data, in order to avoid their alteration, loss, unauthorized con-
sultation or treatment, and which allow for the detection of any intentional or unintentional
distortion of such information, whether the risks arise from human conduct or the technical
means used.”
18See, for instance, the response of the National Copyright Office where it was affirmed
that “only a part of the personnel of DNDA is authorized to access to data. There are
several categories of agents with different levels of access and restrictions regarding the
treatment of data as well as the possibility of uploading and modifying such data. The
access is controlled through a restricted access with user name and personal passwords”.
See response of Inés Garcı́a Holgado, legal adviser of the National Copyright Office, 10
January 2014 (files available at ADC).
19National Registry of Information concerning Missing Minors (RNIPME), Management
Report 2012, 8 April 2013, available at: http://www.jus.gob.ar/media/774132/informe de
gestion 2012.pdf.
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detailed the different categories of users who can have access (operator, ad-
vanced operator, advanced operator with digital signature) and informed
that they have all “signed confidentiality agreements” with the Registry. 20
Some agencies provided information regarding security measures but in
general terms. For example, the National Registry of Family Agriculture
pointed out that its database is connected to the Internet through a “sys-
tem for tracking and collecting” sworn statements which depends on the IT
Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. 21
The agencies which provided information concerning the location of databases
pointed out that such databases are located in the buildings where the dif-
ferent departments work. 22 However, in some cases, they are located in
the offices of other agencies. 23 In general, the technical offices of the Min-
istries where such databases are located are in charge of security measures,
24 which seems to suggest that there is not a centralized control system or
unified standards regarding security.
The answer which showed a different trend –due to both the type of data
provided and the details of such data– was the one from the National Con-
tracting Office (ONC). 25 The ONC manages two important databases which
are relevant for the hiring process of the State: the System of Identification of
Goods and Services and the System of Information of Providers and Trans-
parency, which contains the information published in the ONC’s website.
The physical location of these databases is distributed among three differ-
ent places: the safe room of the AFIP, the DMZ of the Secretary of Finance
(Secretarı́a de Hacienda) and the Data Center of the Under-Secretariat of
Management Technologies (Subsecretarı́a de Tecnologı́as de Gestión).
In all these cases, ONC’s databases have unrestricted public access through
the website www.argentinacompra.gob.ar. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that it is not possible to access to raw data contained in databases since it
is necessary to follow different data identifiers and filters which provide
access to specific information.
As regards the individuals who can have access to information, that de-
pends on the safety measures of each server. For example, the safe room
20Response of the National Registry of Rural Land (RNTR), 22 January 2014 (files avail-
able at ADC).
21Response of Manuel Enrique Pedreida, Director of the National Registry of Family
Agriculture, 7 November 2013 (files available at ADC).
22See, for example, the response of Inés Garcı́a Holgado, legal adviser of the National
Copyright Office, 10 January 2014 (files available at ADC).
23Such as the National Contracting Office (ONC).
24See, for example, the response of Juan Carlos Nadalich, Secretary of Institutional Orga-
nization and Management of the Ministry of Social Development, 11 November 2013.
25Response of Marı́a Verónica Montes, Director of the National Contracting Office, 6
November 2013 (files available at ADC).
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of the AFIP can only be accessed by “authorized staff of the AFIP that be-
longs to the IT support division for databases”, and they only do that upon
request of the ONC. The staff of the ONC that works in the Information
and Transparency System Division (Dirección de Sistemas de Información
y Transparencia) can also have access to the safe room. The access is remote
and “connected point-to-point between the ONC and the safe room of the
AFIP” and by means of “usernames and passwords”. The same situation
occurs with the DMZ of the Secretary of Finance. The ONC does not have
direct access to the Data Center of the Under-Secretariat of Management
Technologies.
The safe room of the AFIP has relevant security measures to protect data: it
is a protected, fireproof room with safety measures and access restricted to
specially authorized people. 26 The room has a monitoring system regard-
ing network traffic and cyber-attacks which may put the security of the data
contained in such room at risk. According to AFIP, “between 200,000 and
300,000 attempted attacks occur daily”. 27
It should be noted that the safe room of the AFIP does not only include data
of the ONC but also data from other agencies –for example, Presidency of
the Nation– as well as tax data regarding the transactions that 8 million tax
payers carry out with AFIP in real time. 28 It also includes data concerning
tax statements and “exogenous information that [. . . ] other entities provide,
for example, credit cards, banks, registries of real property and of motor
vehicles, it is all included in the safe room”. 29 This datum is relevant since
databases held by the State tend to include information that private entities
provide to public entities.
“The entity in charge of Ricardo Echegaray has an x-ray of the
economic transactions of each tax payer, including the most fre-
quent consumptions. Travels, purchases made online and at shops,
maintenance expenses for buildings, banking transactions, credit
card statements, online transactions in websites such as Mer-
cado Libre, mobile phone or private health insurance expenses,
among others, are closely followed by the inspectors who cross-
check data in order to identify whether such expenses match
with sworn statements and to identify inconsistencies and po-
tential sanctions”. 30
This datum confirms a permanent surveillance policy which is possible as a




30Cfr. Pagano, M. (2014). La AFIP ya controla todos los gastos de los consumidores. Newspa-
per Clarin. Consulted on 19 July 2014.
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result of technological advances and economy actors’ obligations to inform.
Such flow of information between private and public entities is permitted
by the Law 25326 which sets forth that consent of the data owner shall not be
deemed necessary when “the data are secured from source of unrestricted
public-access”; when the data ” are collected for the performance of the
duties inherent in the powers of the State“; or when the data”refers to the
transactions performed by financial entities, and arise from the information
received from their customers in accordance with the provisions of Section
39 of Law 21526“. (Law 25326, Sections 5 and 11). Financial entities shall
transfer data pursuant to said Section 39 which allows such transfer in fa-
vor of”entities collecting national, provincial and municipal taxes based on
the following conditions: (a) it must relate to a specific responsible; (b) a tax
verification regarding such responsible must have been initiated; and (c) it
must have previously been required formally“. However, the data requests
made by the AFIP”shall not be subject to the first two conditions set forth in
this Subsection“.
The Financial Institutions Law is a significant example given the way by
which authorization is granted: there are bans established but with gener-
ous exceptions concerning transfer or access to data in favor of governmen-
tal entities. It follows a legislative method similar to the one followed by
Law 25326, mentioned at the beginning of this document, which shows a
common pattern: bans and guarantees are set aside when the State inter-
venes.
This trend of massive storage and incorporation of data from private entities
is problematic from the point of view of privacy. Beatrı́z Busaniche from
Fundación Vı́a Libre stated that:
“The ability to register and process data as well as to cross-check
data has no precedent in history. Ability to calculate, software
development, advances which have no historical comparison. A
key issue to consider is the fact that the State must not collect
a quantity of data larger than that strictly necessary to fulfill its
targets. The main point of a public policy by which the storage
of data is considered a measuring instrument, is to collect a mini-
mum quantity of data required to fulfill a target. Such processing
of data must be transparent for citizens who must be aware of
the purpose for which such data is collected and, when data are
not essential, citizens must have the power to refuse to provide
such data. Another point to consider is that the entity is not the
owner of such data and must guarantee their privacy and secu-
rity. I am particularly concerned about the fact that if you know
the CUIT (tax ID) of a person, you can obtain at AFIP a lot of
personal data, address, tax category, all of which represents an
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attractive target for thieves. The number of people who sell per-
sonal data obtained through AFIP is overwhelming. The State
is not the owner of our data and thus must ensure its protection
and comply with the guarantees set forth by the Constitution”.
31
The fact that data can be easily transferred among different public entities
and that there are several obligations performed by the various economy
actors create, in every way, puts the privacy of such data at risk. The safe
room or the DMZ systems are of no use if the information there contained
is shared with governmental entities whose practices or systems are less
secure: the strength of a chain, as it will be described below, depends on its
weakest link.
It is important to analyze the action of the DNPDP concerning governmen-
tal databases. The response of the National Migration Office (DNM) was
significant since it answered the questions and enclosed the electoral reg-
istries of its databases contained on the DNPDP. It is relevant to analyze
such data for the following reason: it allows to know what kind of informa-
tion the DNPDP holds in governmental databases.
From analyzing such records of voters it may be seen that DNM has in-
formation regarding human resources and employees’ fingerprints, images,
marital status, university degree, occupation, sanctions, evaluations, clinical
records, pre-employment examinations, retirement and labor union affilia-
tions. All such data “must only be provided by the owner”32. Moreover, it
was informed that such data is kept indefinitely, that is, forever. Such data
is kept on a central server.
The information provided by the Registry for Admission of Foreigners (Reg-
istro de Admisión de Extranjeros) and by the Registry of Entry and Exit of
Persons to the Argentine Territory (Registro de Ingresos y Egresos de Per-
sonas al Territorio Nacional) is also relevant: apart from the personal data
which are similar to the registration of human resources, both Registries rec-
ognize that they process sensitive data and that they intend to transfer and
make massive cessions of such data to third parties as well as to transfer
such data to other data banks and entities abroad. 33 Regarding security
measures, they informed that such data can be used by 14 governmental
agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education,
INDEC, RENAPER, the Secretary of Tourism, AFIP and all security forces.
31Cfr. Filozof, L. (2012). El gran hermano fiscal. Magazine Veintitrés. Consulted on 19 July
2014.
32Cfr. Memorandum No. 378/13 from the National Migration Office (DNM). Files avail-
able at ADC.




IV The case of photographs on the electoral roll
Legal action
The case we will be discussing below reveals one of the problems of a per-
missive Act towards the treatment and transfer of information among gov-
ernmental entities. The case came to the knowledge of ADC due to the work
done by this organization to defend human rights in general and the right
of individuals to their privacy in particular. In the context of this report it
works as a paradigmatic case study that identifies the risks that may arise
from the misuse of information of individuals.
The case reached ADC through Enrique Chaparro, President of Fundación
Vı́a Libre, who found in the online consultation system of the Electoral Roll
that the information about the place where he must vote in the election that
took place in October 2013 included the photograph of his DNI. This re-
vealed that the National Electoral Chamber had received such information
from the National Registry of People, the public authority which stores such
information pursuant to Executive Order 17671.
ADC’s initial approach to the problem was to consider it as an unlawful
communication of data that should be called into question because it also af-
fected the principle of specification of purpose of the Law 25326, established
in the Section 4.3: “The data subject to treatment shall not be used for any
purpose or purposes which are different from or incompatible with those
giving rise to their collection”. Furthermore, we suspected that the prohi-
bition of communication stated in Section 11 of the Law, which requires for
its enforcement “to meet the purposes directly related to the legitimate in-
terests of the person responsible for data file and the recipient” and “the
consent previously given by the data owner, who must be informed about
the purpose of such communication of data, and provided with an identifi-
cation of the recipient or with the elements that enable him or her to identify
such recipient”, had been violated“.
However, when we started to analyze the problem in depth, we noticed the
situation was much more complex.
In fact, we soon realized that it was possible to argue that the extensive
authorizations of storage, treatment and communication of personal data
among governmental entities could be alleged to justify the communication
between the National Registry of People (RENAPER) and the National Elec-
34Cfr. Memorandum No. 378/13 from the National Migration Office (DNM). Files avail-
able at ADC
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toral Chamber. As mentioned above, Section 11.3c of the Law 25326 allows
communications of data without the consent of the data owners when such
communications of data “takes place directly between governmental agen-
cies, to the extent of their corresponding competencies”. That argument was
problematic since the communication of data itself could not be called into
question, even though it was anyway questioned for violating the principle
of specification of purpose above mentioned. Nevertheless, we went to look
for the Law that had introduced the photographs of citizens to the Electoral
Roll.
The first regulation we found was the Decision 18/13 issued by the National
Electoral Chamber in March 2013. Such decision stated that each voter’s
photograph should be included in the temporary online electoral system
that was available on the website: www.padron.gob.ar. Also, the decision
introduced new models of electoral rolls to be used in the elections that
would include the voters’ photographs for the so-called “special electoral
roll”, which is available to the presiding officer of the polling station.
The extensive data that shall be included in the National Electoral Register,
in accordance with a judicial decision, was considered a problem for us.
Given the fact that such extension affects constitutional rights like the right
of privacy and the right to vote, it shall be stipulated by law. However, that
law was already enacted: Section 3 of the Law 26744, passed in November
2012, under which the right to vote was extended to minors of 16 years old,
amended Section 15 of the National Electoral Code.
“Said Section 15 states that the National Electoral Register shall
compile computerized records and information on paper. Com-
puterized records shall contain the following personal data of
each voter: first name and surname, sex, place and date of birth,
address, occupation, type and number of the identity document
required, specifying what type it is, date of identification and
filiation data. The condition of absent shall be expressed in the
event of enforced disappearance where appropriate. The com-
petent authority shall determine the way in which fingerprints,
photos and signatures of each voter shall be included. Informa-
tion on paper shall contain, in addition to the personal data re-
quired for the computerized record, fingerprints, and the origi-
nal signature of the voter, and the photograph (the highlighted
belongs to us).
This means that the Argentine National Congress delegated in the National
Electoral Chamber, as the competent authority of the argentine electoral
regime, the power to include fingerprints, photographs and signatures. These
data are contained in the DNI and also in the Argentine National Registry
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of People (RENAPER) which is an agency that, pursuant to Article 17 of the
National Electoral Code, shall
“send to the National Electoral Register, in electronic form, the
data belonging to each voter and future voters. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, the Argentine National Registry of People shall
send periodically documentary evidence of every computer en-
try that shall remain in the unique and centralized custody of the
National Electoral Chamber (. . . )The National Electoral Cham-
ber may regulate both the conditions under which the Argentine
National Registry of People shall send the information and the
appropriate mechanisms for its permanent updating and con-
trol, in accordance with the Law and the possibility of acquiring
new technologies to improve the electoral registry system.”
As we can see, the State did not need to justify that the communication
of data had taken place upon the extensive authorizations granted in Law
25326; there were specific laws that allowed such communication.
The National Electoral Chamber explained, in the Decision 18/13, that the
inclusion of the photographs would be implemented as a pilot project:
“In this sense, and taking into account that the inclusion of pho-
tographs would be, as emphasized, a pilot project, it is therefore
appropriate in that case to provide for the inclusion of the pho-
tograph, whether in print and on the Internet, to the provisional
elector roll, in order for the electors to have the opportunity to
make any pertinent observation in advance”35.
According to the Judicial Information Centre’s report, the online electoral
roll database contained the photographs of 9,338,672 electors, meaning 30.59%
of the total registered electors on the definitive national electoral roll36.
The situation was serious. As ADC explained in the recourse of amparo,
the images of the faces of more than 9 million citizens are available on the
Internet and, therefore, any people who may know the minimum personal
information can have access to them. Such personal information can be eas-
ily obtained and can also be subject to a data automatic recovery process“.
35National Electoral Chamber. Decision 18/13. Recital 7.
36Cfr. Judicial Information Centre (CIJ). (2013). Más de 9 millones de electores tienen su
fotografı́a en los padrones.
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ADC’s arguments
The right to privacy
The argument of ADC was based on the right to privacy recognized by the
Argentine Constitution and by International Human Rights Treaties that
were incorporated into the Constitution with constitutional hierarchy.
“In the Argentine legal system, the right to privacy is a broad
right which also includes a dimension related to personal auton-
omy and other related to intimacy. With regard to the first sense
–which is broader and more generous and is set forth in Section
19 of the Constitution– the purpose is to ‘guarantee that all indi-
viduals can be in a position to develop their own lives acoording
to their own decisions’. The second sense is more limited and is
set forth in Section 18 of the Constitution which states that ‘the
domicile may not be violated, as well as the written correspon-
dence and private papers; and a law shall determine in which
cases and for what reasons their search and occupation shall be
allowed’. As Nino explains, it is ‘a personal area which is safe-
guarded from other individuals’ general knowledge’. Such area
goes beyond the domicile or private papers and includes all citi-
zens’ communications as well as different aspects of the person-
ality and spaces where one can ‘reasonably expect privacy’.
The right to privacy is also a fundamental right to develop a
democratic citizenship. Without the right to decide regarding
one’s life and without a private space free from the view of oth-
ers, some basic freedoms which are key to develop a democratic
citizenship will not be fully exercised. For example, the rights
of freedom of expression, of assembly or of association cannot
be fully exercised if –for example– citizens are subject to con-
trol or surveillance measures by the State. In the same way,
the right to informational self-determination guaranteed by per-
sonal data protection laws also has the purpose to guarantee a
‘private’ space necessary to perform self-determination and to
be protected from third parties who may threaten such funda-
mental freedom“. 37
37Joint Habeas Data Action filed by ADC. Internal quotes belong to Gargarella, R. (2008).
Constitucionalismo y Privacidad. Teorı́a y Crı́tica del Derecho Constitucional (1st. edition,
Volumes 1-2, Vol. II, pages. 779–793). Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot y Nino, C. S. (1992).
Fundamentos de derecho constitucional: análisis filosófico, jurı́dico y politológico de la
práctica constitucional. Astrea.
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ADC considered that the careless treatment by the State concerning citizens’
photographs collected as a result of the National ID Card (DNI) represented
a risk for the autonomy of citizens since it prevented them from having
control over such a personal and sensitive datum as the photograph of their
own faces. Moreover, upon publication through a system of open access
any person with a minimum quantity of a person’s data could have access
to them. Therefore, such a personal and sensitive datum became generally
known by other citizens, as Nino described intimacy38.
The right to self-image and the risks created
Furthermore, ADC argued that the rights to privacy and intimacy are not
the only ones directly affected. The careless treatment by the State regard-
ing personal and sensitive data indirectly produces a wider impact since it
increases the possibility that third parties may use such data in violation of
rights.
“The possibility that the State or private entities may have ac-
cess to citizens’ sensitive data has never been so high. In fact, the
careless publication of photographs on the Internet affects –as
informed– more than 30 per cent of the electoral roll and repre-
sents a de facto transfer of data to third parties who may collect
such data and include them in databases with illegal purposes”.
39
These arguments were used regarding the protection of the image as a spe-
cial form to protect the right to privacy. 40 Moreover, the negative impact
of the right to self-image was described. It is the right not to consent access,
reproduction and publication of the image to third parties who lack autho-
rization of the owner to do so.
In this respect, the Supreme Court of Spain has argued that the protection
of the image “is guaranteed by recognizing the power to prevent uncondi-
tional dissemination of the physical appearance since it represents the first
element to create the personal area of each individual. It is a basic instru-
ment for external identification and projection as well as for self-recognition
of the individuals as such”. 41
38Cfr. Nino, page 304 and subsequent pages.
39Cfr. Joint Habeas Data Action filed by ADC.
40Cfr. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protec-
tion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue. A/HRC/17/27. 16 May
2011, paragraph 58.
41Cfr. SSTC 231/1988; 99/1994; 81/2001; 139/2001; 156/2001; 83/2002.
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The image as sensitive data
ADC argued that images represent, in many cases, sensitive data pursuant
to Law 25326 which defines them as “personal data revealing racial and
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious, philosophical or moral beliefs,
labor union membership, and information concerning health conditions or
sexual habits or behavior”.
The face of individuals may reveal –at least in many cases– their racial origin
or even their religious beliefs. In fact, shameful acts of racial discrimination
such as Jim Crow laws from southern United States or the apartheid in South
Africa were based, almost entirely, on the skin color of people. Given the
risk they pose to personal autonomy, this type of data deserve higher stan-
dards of protection than common personal data. The possibility to create
databases with racial or ethnic origins of citizens and the fact that such data
may be analyzed or classified automatically through algorithms which de-
tect certain facial features evidences the nature of the risks created by the
careless processing of data involved in this situation.
Such possibility increases with the use of automated facial recognition sys-
tems. This is possible through the analysis of the individual’s facial features
obtained from the image which is compared online to other images con-
tained in a database. In practice, an “unknown” image is taken and com-
pared to other image of the same face in an assembly of “known” images.
In the case under consideration, the images uploaded to the online electoral
roll belonged to the group of known images which included certain infor-
mation that made the identification of individuals possible (name, surname,
DNI, section and electoral circuit).
Violation of the principles of specification of purpose and
proportionality
The incorporation of photographs to the National Electoral Register as a
result of a communication of data made by the Renaper violated the prin-
ciple of specification of purpose which is key for regulating the protection
of personal data. This principle set forth in Section 4.3 of Law 25326 estab-
lishes that “the data subject to treatment shall not be used for any purpose
or purposes which are different from or incompatible with those giving rise
to their collection”. In fact, the photographs of the new DNI were provided
to be incorporated to the databases of Renaper and to the new DNI. The
incorporation of such data to the National Electoral Register clearly repre-
sents a purpose different from the one established in Law 25326 and is, as a
consequence, forbidden by law.
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They are two separate registries with different legal purposes. The first one
is the National Registry of People created by the Law 17671 with the pur-
pose of gathering data of the entire Argentine population and of exercising
the powers recognized in Section 2 of such law. The second one is the Na-
tional Electoral Register, which is regulated by the National Electoral Code
and has the purpose to register Argentine citizens who are entitled to vote
in order to prepare the electoral rolls. From our point of view, the clear dif-
ference between the purposes of both registries makes it impossible for one
registry to use the data collected by the other.
Moreover, the incorporation of photographs breaches the principle of pro-
portionality which is also key to any protective framework of personal data.
Indeed, the storage and use of personal data affect the right to privacy and
thus must be strictly analyzed according to their proportionality. 42 As a
consequence, the State must justify why the incorporation of citizens’ pho-
tographs to the National Electoral Register is required in order to prepare
the electoral rolls and why it represents a legal purpose of the State. In
view of the fact that the electoral system has worked properly with a mini-
mum quantity of data for years, a greater quantity of such data represents a
higher influence on the right to privacy. ADC considered that the constitu-
tionality of such influence was doubtful since there are no apparent reasons
to believe, from a constitutional point of view, that the performance of the
electoral system requires such a change.
Therefore, ADC has challenged the constitutionality of Sections 15 and 17
of the National Electoral Code since they set forth the incorporation of pho-
tographs to online electoral rolls and the transfer of data from the Renaper
to the National Electoral Register. ADC has also challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Decision 18/13 of the National Electoral Chamber which
establishes the incorporation and organization of the photographs of vot-
ers to the electoral rolls without the necessary statutory and constitutional
provisions of the case.
Lack of consent and of information
As mentioned above, although the communication of data was authorized
by law, we challenged the fact that the duty to inform during such commu-
nication was breached: we considered that such duty –which is set forth
in Section 11 of the Law 25326– is independent from the previous consent
of the data owner. Such duty to inform allows citizens to know who stor-
ages and processes their personal data, which enables them to keep certain
42Cfr. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protec-
tion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue. A/HRC/17/27. 16 May
2011.
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control over such data and to monitor that they are not misused.
Insecurity on databases
Finally, a large part of the argument of ADC was based on a particular mat-
ter concerning how data had been uploaded to an online database which
may be consulted by citizens. In fact, ADC emphasized that the security
measures of databases which were consulted through the website of the
electoral roll were not enough and thus all the information contained therein
was at risk and the State had the duty to adopt urgent security measures.
Indeed, the information contained in the online electoral roll had been up-
loaded to private websites based abroad43. According to ADC, “the careless
processing of such data by the National Electoral Chamber has placed them
at risk and thus affected the rights to privacy and intimacy of all voters”.
Subsequent events
The concerns regarding the deficiencies in the security of databases were
verified a few weeks after the joint habeas data action was filed by ADC,
the intervening judge having failed to adopt the precautionary measures
which had been requested. In fact, before the action having been filed by
ADC some deficiencies have already been detected: in August 2013 the
blog Segu-Info reported to Computer Emergency Response Team from Ar-
gentina (ArCERT) the vulnerable condition of databases, no measures hav-
ing been taken by the relevant authorities. This vulnerable condition had
also been reported by Enrique Chaparro in a letter sent to the National Elec-
toral Chamber. The only response was to remove –temporarily– his photo-
graph from the online consultation system.
After the recourse of amparo was filed by ADC, such alleged vulnerable
condition became real: in October 2013, a 16 year old boy found out how
the online consultation website of the electoral roll was connected to the
database of the National Electoral Chamber. Specifically, he detected how
the application of the National Electoral Chamber for Android systems was
connected to a database hosted in a server of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
under a base64 secure data encryption system which is –as the young boy
argued– “a reversible encryption algorithm, that is, not enough secure”. 44
Since the Android application was programmed in Java, the original code
was easily accessible and so it could be checked that the encryption system
only replaced certain letters for others.
43For example, the website: www.argentinaelecciones.com.
44Cfr. Another Bit in the Wall. 20 October 2013.
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“By converting this pseudo-code into any programming language,
one can arbitrarily apply queries to the database of the Electoral
Roll with the risks involved: the data of any individual, such as
the one holding the DNI number 1(. . . ), can be requested without
providing any other kind of information, only the DNI number
and the sex, without captcha, without any limitation” (the high-
lighted belongs to us). 45
A few days after this warning, somebody published anonymously at the
website Jsfiddle.net a complete code which could be used in such website
to obtain the photographs of the electoral roll. The Privacy Area of ADC
used that code for one night and obtained the photographs of more than
5,000 Argentine citizens. Such information was submitted as part of the
evidence of the recourse of amparo filed by ADC and the final judgment is
still pending. The National Electoral Chamber eliminated the system when
the news regarding the vulnerable condition reached the media.
Within the framework of the proceeding, the intervening judge requested a
report to the Department of Technological Crimes (División Delitos Tecnológicos,
DDT) of the Argentine Federal Police in order to analyze whether the facts
alleged by ADC were in fact possible. The report from 10 June 2014 is con-
cise: it only explains in two pages that DDT’s technicians entered the web-
sites where the code which allowed the users to download the photographs
of the electoral roll had been uploaded. In this regard, DDT explained the
following:
“It should be noted that in order to carry out such task, the code
must be used as it was published, in any server of Internet con-
tents since such code is a basic programming code which does
not include any SQL injection technique, or any similar tech-
nique, that allows the obtention of a large amount of data. On
the contrary, it is a code which uses the website programming
and evidences its security” (the highlighted belongs to us). 46
As it may be seen, the expert opinion ordered by the Court proved that the
complaint filed was true: the programming code was in essence vulnerable
and the photographs of millions of Argentines was made available to any
individual with basic programming knowledges. As of the completion of
this report, the first instance ruling was still pending.
45Id.
46Judicial Notice of the Argentine Federal Police. Office for the Fight against Organized
Crime. Computer Crimes Department. Received on 14 June 2014 at the Federal Court
No. 1 in charge of Marı́a Romilda Servini de Cubrı́a, in the case entitled “ADC c. Cámara
Electoral s/ amparo ley 16.968, Expediente 3246/13”.
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V Conclusion and recommendations
The present report has tried to shed some light on the manner in which the
State handles our personal data. Although in some cases it is possible to
verify adequate security practices, such as the AFIP’s safe room, it is also
possible to see that those practices are not the result of public policies im-
plemented by the authority in charge of the protection of Argentine citizens’
data, that is, the National Bureau of Personal Data Protection (DNPDP).
Said entity, which was thought out to be self-governed and independent,
has been limited in its action capacity by low budget and low human re-
sources allocations. Additionally, its operations made the DNPDP take a
turn towards control, which is limited by the aforementioned reasons, over
private parties. This means that the State seems to be absent under the
DNPDP’s gaze, and that is possibly the result of a large range of authoriza-
tions granted by Law 25326 to the treatment and use of personal data within
the State. Accordingly, when the DNPDP gets close to one of the many se-
rious problems concerning data, such as those created by sites that issue
reports on private individuals, it only scratches the surface. To illustrate
this, in the framework of complex sanctioning proceedings, with limited ac-
tion capacity, the DNPDP cannot get to the bottom of the problem and this
is all linked to the poor use of personal data on the part of the State.
The case of the online electoral roll is one example of that poor use, which
is, however, highly revealing.
Indeed, the case shows that security measures would be strengthened if
uniform criteria were adopted. For example, if the Renaper’s data were in
a safe room, that effort would be useless if the information is transferred to
a party following insecure practices such as the ones adopted by the Na-
tional Electoral Chamber. Consensual criteria for security do not seem to be
present. For instance, after ACD’s requests to access to information, it was
established that server security depends on the technical areas of each de-
partment. It is unknown if those technical areas are coordinated. However,
as revealed by the electoral roll case, they do not seem to be.
Furthermore, it is noticeable that transference and communication of data
processes from Renaper to the National Electoral Chamber went completely
unperceived for the DNPDP. This is probably related to the legal authoriza-
tions existing in that case, and to the significant fact that nobody has deemed
necessary to ask the DNPDP to issue a ruling on that transference. As far as
we know, the DNPDP did not intervene sua sponte neither. Permissive laws
towards the State, as well as a subordinated enforcement authority, obstruct,
rather than enable, the DNPDP’s roles of control and defense of rights.
Finally, it should be noted that the DNPDP’s role of control, and its pow-
ers and duties assigned by law widely exceed its budget and organization.
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Beyond the flaws in the design of the law, which is a consequence of the
presidential veto at the time the law was passed, the truth is that those flaws
were ratified, year after year, through budget allocations. The DNPDP sim-
ply lacks resources to do what it is expected by law.
This report leads to, at least partially, certain conclusions that allow to think
of an agenda of defense and protection of the right to privacy towards the
future. This agenda cannot just be the result of the analysis of an organiza-
tion, such as ACD in this case, that has sought to study the operation of the
data protection system in practice. This agenda must be the result of a flow-
ing dialogue among different parties interested in the defense of a funda-
mental right in a modern democracy. This report seeks to be a contribution
in what we deem to be a necessary debate. Here are some recommendations
we believe can inform a debate process over an agenda concerning privacy
for the next years.
VI Recommendations
• Law 25326 itself should be revised. Indeed, the enforcement author-
ity created by the law must be truly independent and must guarantee
suitable financing for itself, so that it can comply with important func-
tions of defense of the rights assigned by the law. It would be con-
venient to explore models of the Privacy Commissioner of some Anglo-
Saxon countries, which seem to have succeeded in the defense of citi-
zens’ personal data.
• Revision of Law 26,326 cannot be made in an isolated manner. ADC
considers necessary to analyze the Law taking into account the enact-
ment of a law of Access to Public Information. Both rights, access and
data protection, can come into conflict. We believe it is necessary that
the Argentine legal framework accounts for the tension between the
two of them and determine, with the utmost possible degree of cer-
tainty, those cases in which access must be prioritized and those cases
in which privacy protection is imposed.
• Storage capacity and communication of data within the State must
be limited. The current law is, as mentioned, too permissive. This
would allow, not only to maintain a stricter control over governmental
agencies, but also to avoid any risks of data falling into private hands
and be exploited by private entities for commercial purposes or other
kind.
• Transparency and consensus on security criteria must be worked on.
It would be desirable that a public agency, which may be the National
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Office of Information Technology (ONTI), establish consensual secu-
rity criteria, which should be made public. Unlike the DNPDP, which
prevented certain security guarantee details to be revealed, knowl-
edge of those guarantees does not increase vulnerability for systems,
but it allows citizens to evaluate it their data have the level of protec-
tion they deserve.
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